Independence

Independence

Are Men Helpful?

Are Men Helpful?

The Biggest Lies On The Internet.

The Biggest Lies On The Internet

The Most Dangerous Foods According To Dietary Experts.

The Most Dangerous Foods According To Dietary Experts

Ethics and Suicide

Ethics and Suicide

There are two primary essential issues with respect to suicide: first, regardless of whether suicide is ethically reasonable, and assuming this is the case, in what conditions; and second, whether an individual who realises that somebody is examining or endeavouring suicide has a commitment to mediate and provided that this is true, how solid that commitment is.

Regarding the primary issue, it is hard to oppose the end that suicide is right in itself. To portray suicide as homicide of one's self is mistaken. Regardless of whether individuals who end it all deny the network of some great, there is no broad obligation to give great administrations to other people.

Religious issues with suicide are not powerful. Also, suicide could be rational. For instance, if one's plan of qualities is to augment the general estimation of experience, and if sooner or later negative worth exceeds positive worth, suicide would be sanely shown. Concerning intercession, various contemplation apply to people engaged with somebody thinking about or endeavouring suicide, experts, and the overall people. The individuals who are included have their own lives to live and require not adjust them not with  standing  when someone else's life is in question. Experts ought not become paternalistic specialists who keep subjects alive without wanting to and hopeless for inconclusive periods. The overall common people has just a frail obligation to spare outsiders from suicide.

مفهوم الموت فى علم الموت والاحتضار

مفهوم الموت فى علم الموت والاحتضار

يشتق مصطلح علم الموت والاحتضار Thanatology من الكلمة اليونانية Thanatos إله الموت عند اليونان . وقد بدأ هذا العلم فى عام 1956 , عندما قام مجموعة من علماء النفس الامريكيين باجراء مجموعة من الابحاث النفسية عن الموت , ومن اشهر هذه الابحاث مجموعة الابحاث التى قدمتها الدكتوره اليزيبث كبلر روز Elisabet Kubler Ross تحت عنوان فى الموت والاحتضار ON DEATH AND DYING عام 1969.

ويهتم علم الموت والاحتضار بدراسة اسباب الوفاة , مسألة نقل الاعضاء , كما يهتم بالمعالجة النفسية للحزن والآلم الناتج عن الموت والاحتضار سواء اكان عند المحتضر او عائلته .

وينظر علم دراسة الموت والاحتضار الى الموت على انه : توقف المخ عن العمل . فقد اتضح علميا ان المخ هو المسيطر , والقلب مجرد مضخة , ومن ثم يكون توقف المخ عن العمل لا توقف القلب هو معيار الموت ومقياسه . 

وقد يعرف علم الموت والاحتضار الموت احيانا بانه : " لا مخ , لا شخصية " . ويظهر من هذالتعريف جمع علم الموت والاحتضار بين كل من المفهوم الطبى فى تعريف الموت , ذلك الذى يرى ان الموت هو " توقف المخ " وتحديدا توقف " جذع المخ " وليس توقف القلب عن النبض ولا انقطاع التنفس , وبين المفهوم النفسى , والذى يرى ان الموت هو : كف تام ودائم للوعى او الشعور .

التعريف الفلسفى للموت

التعريف الفلسفى للموت

يتعدد المفهوم الفلسفى للموت بتنوع الفلاسفة , اذ لا يوجد اتفاق بين الفلاسفة على تعريف محدد للموت , فكل فيلسوف له فلسفته الخاصه , وبالتالى يأتى تعريفه للموت ليعكس هذه الفلسفة .

ومن اهم التعريفات التى قدمها الفلاسفة للموت :

افلاطون Plato : الموت هو " انفصال النفس Soul عن البدن Body ". أرسطو Aristotle : الموت هو " تحرر العقل الفعال من النفس " . أما أبيقور Epicurus فيعرف الموت بانه : " غياب الاحساس " . فى حين عرف ماركوس اورليوس Marcus Aurelius  الموت بانه " انقطاع الانطباعات الحسية عن الحواس , والاوتار المحركة للشهوات , والتفكير المنطقى , ةخدمة الجنس البشرى ".

واذا انتقلنا الى الفلسفة الاسلامية , فاننا سنجد العديد من التعريفات , التى قدمها الفلاسفة , نذكر منها , على سبيل المثال لا الحصر :

تعريف الكندى : الموت هو " تجرد النفس من البدن ". فى حين يعرفه ابن رشد بانه: " تعطل آلة النفس ".

اما فى الفلسفة المسيحية , فمن اهم التعريفات التى قدمها فلاسفة المسيحية :

تعريف القديس اوغسطينوس St.Augustine, حيث عرف الموت بانه : " انفصال النفس عن الجسم ". أما القديس توما الاكوينى St.Tomas D'Aquin فيعرف الموت بانه : : مفارقة النفس العاقلة للجسد ".

واذا انتقلنا الى الفلسفة الحديثة والمعاصرة , فاننا سنجد العديد من التعريفات , ومن اهمها :

تعريف ديكارت Desares الموت هو " مغادرة النفس للجسد نتيجة توقف حرارته وتحلل اعضائه ". اما هولباخ Holbach , فيعرف الموت بانه : " توقف الحركات التى تتألف الحياة من الجمع بينها مثل : الدورة الدموية , التنفس ..". فى حين يعرف ماكس شلر Max Scheler الموت بانه : " تجاوز الروح الشخصية لقيود الجسد ". اما سارتر Sartre فيعرف الموت بانه : " ملاشاة للوعى " .

يظهر لنا من خلال ماسبق كيف تباين تعريف الموت من فيلسوف لاخر , ليعكس كل تعريف منهم النسق الفلسفى الخاص لكل فيلسوف .

مفهوم جهنم أو الجحيم عند اخوان الصفا

مفهوم جهنم أو الجحيم عند اخوان الصفا

اعتقد اخوان الصفا ان جهنم هى " عالم الكون والفساد " , وهم يقصدون بهذا العالم معنيين اساسيين :

الاول , " كون النفس مع الجسم وقتا ما , فيقال لهذا الاجتماع كون , والفساد مفارقة النفس اياه , وتخليها عنه .. وبهذا يكون فساده , والنشوء والبلى يعمان كل ما نشأ ونما , ثم يضمحل ويبلى ".

الثانى , ان جهنم هى " عالم الاجسام التى تحت فلك القمر الذى هو دائم الكون والفساد .." . ويشير توصفيف اخوان الصفا للجحيم بانه " عالم الكون والفساد , و " عالم الاجسام " الى الدنيا وشرورها . لهذا طالب اخوان الصفا بالزهد فى متاع الدنيا , والاستعداد للرحيل .وقد وصف اخوان الصفا الجحيم بعدة اوصاف , فهو :

" اودية الهاوية .. وحشة الظلام والالم والعذاب " , وهو " محل المصائب والاسقام " , وهو " برزخ العذاب " , و " البرزخ المظلم ". ويستخدم اخوان الصفا لفظ " البرزخ " بمعنى حبس النفس فى الجسم وعذابها .

ويلتقى - كما يبدو لنا - توصيف اخوان الصفا للجحيم مع توصيف افلوطين للعالم السفلى بوصفه عالما مظلما , تحتيا , تعاقب فيه النفوس الآثمة .

وقد اعتقد اخوان الصفا ان اهل جهنم هم " النفوس المتعلقة باجساد الحيوانات التى تنالها الالام والاوجاع ..". وهذه اشارة واضحة تعكس اعتقاد اخوان الصفا بعقيدة" تناسخ الارواح " , والتى ترى فى التناسخ نوعا من العقاب تناله النفوس الضالة او المتعلقة بشهوات الجسد .

ويصف اخوان الصفا عذابات اهل النار بقولهم :

" اعلم .. ان .. الارواح الساهية .. يكون خروجها من اجسامها عند نزول الموت بساحتها .. تتلقاهم .. النيران .. و .. العذاب ".

هنا يأخذ الجحيم عند اخوان الصفا طابعا حسيا , يتمثل فى العذاب المادى للنفوس الضالة عن طريق الحق والحقيقة , فيكون عقابها هو العذاب فى النار .

بيد ان المثير هنا - وربما مصدرا للتناقض -  هو قول اخوان الصفا ان النفس من طبيعة نورانية , وقوة روحانية فاضت عن العقل  باذن البارى جل ثناؤه . فاذا كان ذلك كذلك, فكيف يمكن للنفس , وهى من طبيعة نورانية ان تتعذب بالنار , والنار من طبيعة مادية ؟!لا نجد تفسيرا لهذا الامر عند اخوان الصفا .

ويبدو لنا ان اخوان الصفا ربما استشعروا تناقضا ما يعترى تصورهم لعذاب النفس , فنجدهم يقدمون لنا تصورا اخر لعذبات النفس , وهو يتمثل فى رؤيتها لافعالها القبيحة , فتكون هذه الرؤية بمثابة عذابها وجحيمها :

" .. اعلم بأن النفس .. اذا كانت قبيحة .. واخلاقها ردية .. اكسبتها هذه الخصال صورة قبيحة .. فاذا جاءت سكرة الموت .. نظرت الى ذاتها .. وهى صورة قبيحة .. اغتمت وحزنت ..فى ذاتها فذلك هو جزاؤها وعذابها وجحيمها وعقابها ".

DEFINITION OF SUICIDE

DEFINITION OF SUICIDE 

Briefly defined, suicide is the human act of self-inflicted, self-intentioned cessation. Suicide is not a disease (although there are many who think so); it is not a biological anomaly (although biological factors may play a role in some suicides); it is not an immorality (although it has often been treated as such); and it is not a crime in most countries around the world (although it was so for centuries). 

It is unlikely that any one view or theory will ever define or explain phenomena as varied and as complicated as acts of human self-destruction. Our own initial definition is fraught with complexities and difficulties. 

The history of our key word provides only initial assistance. “Suicide”, in fact, is a relatively recent word. According to The Oxford English Dictionary, the word was used in 1651 by Walter Charleton when he said: “To vindicate one’s self from . . . inevitable Calamity, by Sui-cide is not . . . a Crime.” However, the exact date of its first use is open to some question. Some claim that it was first used by Sir Thomas Browne in his book, Religio Medici, published in 1642. Edward Philips, in his 1662 edition of his dictionary, A New World of Words, claimed to have invented the word. The word “suicide” does not appear in Robert Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy (1652 edition), nor in Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary (1755). Before the introduction of the word, other terms, of course, were used to describe “the act”— among them self-destruction, self-killing, self-murder, and self-slaughter. Burton’s phrases for suicide include “to make way with themselves” and “they offer violence to themselves”. The classical (and current) German term is in keeping with this tradition—Selbstmord, or self-murder. Other countries around the world have their own words and definitions. 

Suicide may today be defined differently depending on the purpose of the definition—medical, legal, administrative, etc. In the United States and Canada (and most of the countries reporting to the World Health Organization), suicide is defined (by a medical examiner or coroner) as one of the four possible modes of death. An acronym for the four modes of death is NASH: natural, accidental, suicidal, and homicidal. This fourfold classification of all deaths also has its problems. 

Its major deficiency is that it treats the human being in a Cartesian fashion, namely as a biological machine, rather than appropriately treating him or her as a motivated biopsychosocial organism. That is, it obscures the individual’s intentions in relation to his or her own cessation and, further, completely neglects the contemporary concepts of psychodynamic psychology regarding intention, including unconscious motivation. 

There is no universally accepted definition of suicide today. In fact, there never was one. Indeed, there are numerous definitions: and here is a sampling: Erwin Ringel (Austria): Suicide is the intentional tendency to take one’s own life. 

Charles Bagg (United Kingdom): Suicide is the intentional act of taking one’s life either as a result of mental illness (these illnesses frequently though not always causing distress to the individual carrying out the act) or as a result of various motivations which are not necessarily part of any designated mental illness but which outweigh the instinct to continue to live. 

Walter Hurst (New Zealand): The decision to commit suicide is more often prompted by a desire to stop living than by a wish to die. Suicide is a determined alternative to facing a problem that seems to be too big to handle alone. 

Sarah Dastoor (India): 

I vengeful, killer, hate—inspired—so I die 

I guilty, sinner, trapped—escaping life 

I hoping rebirth, forgiveness divine—live again 

Currently in the Western world, suicide is a conscious act of self-induced annihilation, best understood as a multidimensional malaise in a needful individual who defines an issue for which the suicide is perceived as the best solution.

Branches or Areas of Philosophy

Branches or Areas of Philosophy 

(1) METAPHYSICS 

The word metaphysics is derived from the Greek word meta (above, beyond) and phusika (nature) and means "beyond nature". 

For Aristotle, the term metaphysics meant “first philosophy,” discussion of the most universal principles; later the term came to mean comprehensive thinking about the nature of things. 

Metaphysics attempts to offer a comprehensive view of all that exists. It is concerned with such problems as the relation of mind to matter, the nature of change, the meaning of “freedom,” the existence of God, and the belief in personal immortality. 

Metaphysics as a branch of philosophy is divided into sup-branches; 

1- Ontology is the study of being in general. 

2- Philosophical cosmology is the study of cosmos. 

3- Philosophical theology is the study of God. 

4- Philosophical anthropology is the study of human nature and human existence. 

(2) Axiology 

The word axiology is derived from the Greek words axiom (value) and logia (study) and means "the study of value ". 

Axiology is the philosophical investigation of the nature of value(s) and of the foundations of value judgments. 

Axiology as a branch of philosophy is divided into sup-branches; 

1- Ethics and it concerns itself with the questions of morality. What is right and what is wrong in human relations? What are the basic standards of morality? What is the nature of moral virtue? 

2- Aesthetics and it concerns itself with the questions of art and beauty. The following questions reflect the concerns of aesthetics: what is beauty? What is art? Can we distinguish between art and non-art? What are the standards of aesthetic judgment? 

3- Social and political philosophy investigates value judgments concerning society, the state, and the individual’s relation to these institutions. The following questions reflect the concerns of social and political philosophy: Why should individuals live in society? What social ideals of liberty, rights, justice, equality and responsibility are desirable? Why should anyone obey any government? 

(3) EPISTEMOLOGY 

In general, epistemology is the branch of philosophy that studies the sources, nature, and validity of knowledge. What is the human mind Capable of knowing? From what sources do we gain our knowledge? Do we have any genuine knowledge on which we can depend, or must we be satisfied with opinions and guesses? Are we limited to knowing the bare facts of sense experience, or are we able to go beyond what the senses reveal? The technical term for the theory of knowledge is epistemology, which comes from the Greek word episteme, meaning “knowledge.” There are three central questions in this field: 

1- What are the sources of knowledge? Where does genuine knowledge come from or how do we know? This is the question of origins. 

2- What is the nature of knowledge? Is there a real world outside the mind, and if so can we know it? This is the question of appearance versus reality. 

3- Is our knowledge valid? How do we distinguish truth from falsity? This is the question of the tests of truth, of verification. 

(4) LOGIC 

The word logic is derived from the Greek word logos and means “reason" ". Logic is the study concerned, first, with arguments: 

What is an argument? 

What makes an argument work? 

What makes an argument fail? 

Second, logic is concerned with the laws of logic in accordance with which good arguments must precede, e.g. the law of identity, that of non-contradiction, and that of excluded middle. 

Most influential in logical inquiry as pursued in the western world have been the logical treatises of the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384-322 bce), whose collection is called Organon, which, in Greek, means “instrument”.

Good will An introduction to the philosophy of KANT (1724-1804)

Good will 

An introduction to the philosophy of KANT (1724-1804) 

Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good, without qualification, except a good will. Intelligence wit, judgment, and the other talents of the mind, however they may be named, or courage, resolution, perseverance, as qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects; but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them, and which, therefore, constitutes what is called character, is not good. It is the same with the gifts of fortune. Power, riches, honor, even health, and the general well-being and contentment with one's condition which is called happiness, inspire pride, and often presumption, if there is not a good will to correct the influence of these on the mind, and with this also to rectify the whole principle of acting and adapt it to its end. The sight of a being who is not adorned with a single feature of a pure and good will, enjoying unbroken prosperity, can never give pleasure to an impartial rational spectator. Thus a good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition even of being worthy of happiness. 

There are even some qualities which are of service to this good will itself and may facilitate its action, yet which have no intrinsic unconditional value, but always presuppose a good will, and this qualifies the esteem that we justly have for them and does not permit us to regard them as absolutely good. Moderation in the affections and passions, self-control, and calm deliberation are not only good in many respects, but even seem to constitute part of the intrinsic worth of the person; but they are far from deserving to be called good without qualification, although they have been so unconditionally praised by the ancients. For without the principles of a good will, they may become extremely bad, and the coolness of a villain not only makes him far more dangerous, but also directly makes him more abominable in our eyes than he would have been without it. 

A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition; that is, it is good in itself, and considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it in favor of any inclination, nay even of the sum total of all inclinations. Even if it should happen that, owing to special disfavor of fortune, or the niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing, and there should remain only the good will (not, to be sure, a mere wish, but the summoning of all means in our power), then, like a jewel, it would still shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitfulness can neither add nor take away anything from this value. It would be, as it were, only the setting to enable us to handle it the more conveniently in common commerce, or to attract to it the attention of those who are not yet connoisseurs, but not to recommend it to true connoisseurs, or to determine its value. 

Now we have to develop the notion of a will which deserves to be highly esteemed for itself and is good without a view to anything further, a notion which exists already in the sound natural understanding, requiring rather to be cleared up than to be taught, and which in estimating the value of our actions always takes the first place and constitutes the condition of all the rest. In order to do this, we will take the notion of duty, which includes that of a good will, although implying certain subjective restrictions and hindrances. These, however, far from concealing it, or rendering it unrecognizable, rather bring it out by contrast and make it shine forth so much the brighter.... On the other hand, it is a duty to maintain one's life; and, in addition, everyone has also a direct inclination to do so. But on this account the of anxious care which most men take for it has no intrinsic worth, and their maxim has no moral import. They preserve their life as duty requires, no doubt, but not because duty requires. On the other hand, if adversity and hopeless sorrow have completely taken away the relish for life; if the unfortunate one, strong in mind, indignant at his fate rather than desponding or dejected, wishes for death, and yet preserves his life without loving it-not from inclination or fear, but from duty-then his maxim has a moral worth. 

For Kant it was clear that a moral action was one performed out of a sense of duty, rather than simply out of inclination or feeling or the possibility of some kind of gain for the person performing it. So, for example, if I give money to charity because I have deep feelings of compassion for the needy, I am, in Kant’s view, not necessarily acting morally: if I act purely from my feelings of compassion rather than from a sense of duty, then my action is not a moral one. Or if I give money to charity because I think it will increase my popularity with my friends, then, again, I am not acting morally, but for gain in social status. 

So for Kant the motive of an action was far more important than the action itself and its consequences. He thought that in order to know whether or not someone was acting morally you had to know what their intention was. It was not enough just to know whether or not the Good Samaritan helped the man in need. The Samaritan might have been acting out of self-interest, expecting a reward for his troubles. Or else he might have done it only because he felt a twinge of compassion: this would have been acting from an emotional motive rather than from a sense of duty. 

Maxims 

Kant described the intentions behind any act as the maxim. The maxim is the general principle underlying the action. For instance, the Good Samaritan could have been acting on the maxim ‘Always help those in need if you expect you will be rewarded for your troubles’. Or he could have been acting on the maxim ‘Always help those in need when you experience a feeling of compassion’. However, if the Good Samaritan’s behaviour were moral, then he would probably have been acting on the maxim ‘Always help those in need because it is your duty to do so’. 

The Categorical Imperative 

Kant believed that as rational human beings we have certain duties. These duties are categorical: in other words they are absolute and unconditional – duties such as ‘You ought always to tell the truth’ or ‘you ought never to kill anyone’. They apply whatever consequences might follow from obeying them. Kant thought morality was a system of Categorical Imperatives: commands to act in certain ways. This is one of the most distinctive aspects of his ethics. He contrasted categorical duties with hypothetical ones. 

A hypothetical duty is one such as ‘If you want to be respected, then you ought to tell the truth’ or ‘If you want to avoid going to prison, then you ought not to murder anyone’. Hypothetical duties tell you what you ought or ought not to do if you want to achieve or avoid a certain goal. He thought there was only one basic Categorical Imperative: ‘Act only on maxims which you can at the same time will to be universal laws’. ‘Will’ here means ‘rationally want’. In other words, the message of the Categorical Imperative is only act on a maxim you would rationally want to apply to everybody. This principle is known as the principle of universalizability. 

Universalizability 

Kant thought that for an action to be moral, the underlying maxim had to be a universalizable one. It had to be a maxim which would hold for anyone else in similar circumstances. You should not make an exception of yourself, but should be impartial. So, for example, if you stole a book, acting on the maxim ‘Always steal when you are too poor to buy what you want’, for this to have been a moral act, this maxim would have had to apply to anyone else in your position. Of course this doesn’t mean that any maxim whatsoever which can be universalized is for that reason a moral one. It is obvious that many trivial maxims, such as ‘Always poke your tongue out at people who are taller than you’, could quite easily be universalized, even though they have little or nothing to do with morality. Some other universalizable maxims, such as the one about stealing which I used in the previous paragraph, may still be considered immoral. 

This notion of universalizability is a version of the so-called Golden Rule of Christianity, ‘Do unto others as you would have them do unto you’. Someone acting on the maxim ‘Be a parasite, always live at other people’s expense’ would not be acting morally since it would be impossible to universalize the maxim. It would invite the question, ‘What if everyone did that?’ And if everyone were parasites, then there would be no one left for parasites to live on. The maxim fails to pass Kant’s test, and so cannot be a moral one. On the other hand, we can quite easily universalize the maxim ‘Never torture babies’. It is certainly possible and desirable for everyone to obey this order, although they may not. Those who disobey it by torturing babies are acting immorally. With maxims such as this one, Kant’s notion of universalizability quite clearly gives an answer which corresponds to most people’s unquestioned intuitions about right and wrong. 

Means and ends 

Another of Kant’s versions of the Categorical Imperative was ‘Treat other people as ends in themselves, never as means to an end’. This is another way of saying that we should not use other people, but should always recognize their humanity: the fact that they are individuals with wills and desires of their own. If someone is pleasant to you simply because they know that you can give them a job, then they are treating you as a means to getting that job, and not as person, as an end in yourself. Of course, if someone is pleasant to you because they happen to like you, that would not have anything to do with morality.

فلسفة الانتحار عند افلاطون

فلسفة الانتحار عند افلاطون 

يعود الخطاب الفلسفى عن الانتحار الى وقت افلاطون تقريبا , والذى ناقش الانتحار صراحة فى محاورة فيدون , فاعلن على لسان استاذه سقراط : ان البدن سجن النفس , وانه لا يجب على الانسان ان يتخلص من سجنه بالانتحار , وانما عليه ان ينتظر حتى تشاء الارادة الالهية , وذلك لان الانسان ملك لها . ومن ثم فان الانتحار هو فعل مناف للارادة الالهية , ذلك لانه يجرد الالهة من حقها فى انهاء حياة الانسان او استمرارها .

ان حياة الانسان عند سقراط انما تنتهى عندما تقضى الالهة بذلك كما فعلت معه :

" ان اولئك الذين نعيش تحت حراستهم هم الالهة , اما نحن بنى الانسان فلسنا الا جزءا مما يملك الالهة .. اذا ليس من الخطأ ان نقول انه لا ينبغى ان نقتل انفسنا . وان ننتظر حتى تبعث الينا الالهة امرا شبيها بذلك الذى يعرض على اليوم ".

لاشك ان هذا الاعتقاد الافلاطونى عن الانتحار والمستمد من استاذه سقراط يجد اصوله عند العقيدة الاورفية والفلسفة الفيثاغورية التى صرحت بان : " مقامنا نحن بنى الانسان , عبارة عن سجن , وواجب الانسان الا يحرر نفسه او يهرب منه " .

وقد حدد افلاطون فى محاورة القوانين مبدأ العقاب الذى يستحقه المرء الذى ينهى حياته بيده , فقرر انه ينبغى على من " يموتون على ذلك النحو .. ان يدفنوا على نحو شائن فى بقع جرداء لا اسم لها .. ولا يميز القبر بمجرد الاسم .. " .

لاشك ان تقرير افلاطون الى مثل هذه العقوبة يكشف عن رفضه للانتحار . بيد ان افلاطون قد اعترف باستثناءات ثلاث لهذا المبدأ :

1- ان يطلب ذلك منه قانون من قوانين الدولة , كما هو فى حالة سقراط مثلا .

2- ان يسوقه الى ذلك الفعل ضغط كارثة لم يكن هناك سبيل الى تجنبها .

3- ان يكون قد تورط فى عار يائس لا يحتمل .

ويرى افلاطون ان اى شخص ينهى حياته خارج نطاق هذه الاستثناءات الثلاث السابقة فانه شخص ظالم لنفسه , تدفعه " النذالة المجردة والجبن المخنث ".

هنا نلاحظ ان تبرير افلاطون للانتحار قد استند الى ادوار الفرد والتزاماته الاجتماعية متجاهلا فى ذلك الحرية الفردية واستقلال المرء الذاتى , وحريته الشخصية فى تبرير الانتحار , ويظهر ذلك واضحا فى الاستثناء الثانى والثالث للانتحار . ان القول بان تعرض المرء للكوارث او المصائب يبرر الانتحار انما يتجاهل حقيقة ان هذه الحوادث حوادث مؤقتة يمكن تجاوزها بضبط النفس وتغيير بعض جوانب الحياة الخاصة بالفرد , ومن ثم فان اعتقاد افلاطون بامكانية تبرير الانتحار استنادا الى المصائب والعار يعبر عن قصوره فى ادراك حقيقة ان اختيار الانتحار لمواجهة مشكلات الحياة ذات الطابع الكارثى هو بمثابة حل نهائى لمشكلة مؤقتة , ذلك لا لشئ الا لان المنتحر لا يستطيع استعادة حياته السابقة مرة ثانية . فالانتحار نهاية ذات اتجاه واحد غير قابل للعكس .. وهنا يكشف افلاطون عن فلسفة سلبية تجاه مشكلات الحياة وعدم قدرة المرء على تجاوزها . 

بيد ان هذه السلبية من الممكن ان نفسرها فى ضوء نظرة افلاطون لطبيعة العالم الارضى فى حد ذاته , فهذا العالم - كما يراه افلاطون - هو عالم اشباح وظلال , ويخلو من الحقائق . اما العالم الحقيقى موطن الثوابت والمطلقات , والحقائق الفائقات فهو عالم مفارق عن عالمنا , وهو فى كلمة واحدة " عالم المثل " . فاذا كان عالم المثل هو العالم الذى يجب ان ترتحل النفس اليه , وتتطلع بشوق نحو ارتياده فلا يوجد ما يبرر للنفس ان تكابد كوارث الحياة ذات الظلال الكاذبة , لهذا نجد افلاطون على الرغم من معارضته للانتحارض كفعل يصادر على حق الالهة فى انهاء حياة الفرد نجده يعود ويضع الاستثناءات التى يمكن للفرد فى ضوئها ان يقدم على الانتحار دون ان يضع نفسه تحت طائلة اللوم الاجتماعى .. بيد انه فى كل الحالات يكشف عن ضعف نفسى تجاه مواجهة المواقف الحياتية ذات الطابع التراجيدى والمأساوى .. !!

مفهوم الانتحار فى الادب العالمى من هوميروس الى دستوفسكى

مفهوم الانتحار فى الادب العالمى من هوميروس الى دستوفسكى

تعد ظاهرة الانتحار  احد الظواهر القليلة التى شغلت الفكر الانسانى بكافة ابعاده ونواحيه , وربما لا يعادل الانتحار اهمية فى اهتمام الفكر الانسانى ببحثه وفحصه على كافة المستويات سوى الموت .

من هنا خضع الانتحار كظاهرة انسانية الى الفحص الادبى  من عصر هوميروس وحتى دستوفسكى .

فنادرا ما نجد اعمال اديب ما تخلو من عمل يتناول ظاهرة الانتحار , سواء اخذت الاعمال الادبية صورة القصة او اخذت صورة المسرحية او اندرجت تحت لواء الاساطير , وعالم ما وراء المجسات الحسية والمحسوسات المرئية  دائما ما نجد للانتحار مكانا ما فى هذا الادب او ذاك .

فكيف نظر الادب الى الانتحار : فهل هو فعل مباح ام لا ؟ وهل يعد الانتحار عملا اخلاقيا ام هو فعل مضاد للطبيعة الانسانية ؟ وهل يمكن تبرير الانتحار , بمعنى هل هناك ظروف معينة اذا مر بها الانسان يمكن تبرير الانتحار عقلانيا ؟

 كيف اجاب الادباء على هذه الاسئلة ؟ دعونا نبحث ونفحص وننظر فيما ارتكنوا اليه من مبادئ ...

1- هوميروس :

هوميروس شاعر يونانى , عاش فى الفترة ما بين القرن الثامن والقرن السابع ق.م , ومن اهم اعماله : الالياذة Iliad والاوديسة Odyssey . اما الالياذة فتدور احداثها حول حرب طروادة Trojan War فى حين تدور احداث الاوديسة حول عودة اوديسيوس Odysseus بعد سقوط طروادة الى وطنه ايثاكا Ithaca .

وقد عرض هوميروس موقفه من الانتحار فى مؤلفه الاوديسة حيث يروى رحلة اوديسيوس الى العالم السفلى . ففى هذه الرحلة يقابل اوديسيوس " جاكستا " . وجاكستا وفق ما تروى الاسطورة قد تزوجت اوديب وهى لا تعلم انه ابنها , وانجبت منه اربعة اطفال .. ونتيجة لاكتشافها هذا الامر المفزع قررت جاكستا الانتحار . هنا يتعامل هوميروس مع الانتحار كفعل مقبول يصدر نتيجة موقف كارثى , لايمكن للمرء ان يتحمله , فصدمة اكتشاف هذه الحقيقة بالنسبة لجاكستا كان بمثابة النهاية التى لا يمكن ان يتلوها اى استمرارية وجودية .. فالانتحار هنا فعل مقبول وليس موضع استهجان اجتماعى , بل هو على العكس من ذلك امر مرحب به لا سيما اذا عزت البدائل , وتأزمت المواقف ..!!!

2- دانتى :

قدم دانتى موقفه من الانتحار فى مؤلفه الاشهر " الكوميديا الالهية " , وفى هذا المؤلف يرى دانتى ان الانتحار هو عنف موجه نحو الذات . هو ابادة ذاتية تنطوى على ضعف حب الانسان لذاته اولا .. ثم هو ثانيا , يدمر ما خلق الله .

فى ضوء ذلك رفض دانتى الانتحار , وذلك لانه من ناحية يبيد الموجود الانسانى ثم هو ثانيا يدمر الانسان الذى هو صنيعة الله .

لهذا كان جزاء الشخص الذى يقدم على انهاء حياته ان يكابد الويلات والعذابات فى الجحيم .

بيد ان دانتى لم يضع المنتحرين فى ذات المرتبة من مراتب الجحيم , ولكنه قام بتصنيفهم وفق دوافع الانتحار : فوضع كليوباترا فى المرتبة الثانية من مراتب الجحيم فى حين وضع يهوذا فى المنطقة الرابعة من الدائرة التاسعة فى اعماق الجحيم . وتفسير تباين هذه المراتب عند دانتى هو ان حب الله مقدم على حب الذات ومن ثم كان جزاء من يكفر بالله - كما هو الحال بالنسبة ليهوذا -هو المرتبة الرابعة فى الجحيم فى حين كان جزاء من يكفر بذاته ويقع فى اسر الخطيئة - كما هو حال كليوباترا - هو المرتبة الثانية من مراتب الجحيم .

من الواضح هنا ان اساس رفض دانتى للانتحار واعتباره اياه فعل مرفوض , انما يستند الى منطلقات دينية مصدرها الكنيسة التى كانت تشكل تعاليمها فى تلك الفترة القوة المحركة للشعور الفكرى الغربى . بيد انه يتجاهل الحرية الفردية ويسلب الانسان حريته فى انهاء حياته وهو ما سبق وان وجدناه عند افلاطون . فهنا لا نجد دانتى يقيم اى وزن للقرارات الانسانية او قدرة الانسان على ان يختار البدائل المتاحة امامه لكى يتخطى مواقف الحياة لا سيما تلك المواقف ذات الطابع المأساوى او الكارثى ..

3- دستوفسكى :

ربط  دستوفسكى الانتحار بالاخلاق , الخلود , والارادة .. فيرى ان من لا يؤمن بالحياة بعد الموت , لا يستطيع ان يفهم وجوده الارضى على النحو الصحيح , وبدون هذا الفهم يصير الانسان كالحيوان , اذا وجد الباب مفتوحا , انطلق وهرب ..

ويرى دستوفسكى ان عدم اعتقاد المرء فى الحياة بعد الموت يقود الى اللامبالاه الاخلاقية . فالقول بان كل شىء سيموت فكل شىء مباح . وما دام كل شىء مباح , فانه يستطيع ان يفعل ما يحلو له , فيستطيع ان يقتل نفسه او يقتل غيره .

ويربط دستوفسكى بين الحرية والانتحار فيرى ان الحرية هى صفة خاصة بالانسان , وهى ما يجعل الانسان يشعر بانسانيته .

فى ضوء ذلك اعتقد دستوفسكى  انه اذا لم يتوازن احساس الانسان بحريته مع اعتقاده بخلود النفس , فانه قد يرتكب اشياء مجنونة , لكى يثبت لنفسه انه حر . مثال ذلك " كريلوف " فى رواية " مذكرات فى العالم السفلى " انتحر لكى يثبت انه حر ويستطيع ان يتصرف وفق ارادته الخاصة . فيقول كريلوف بطل دستوفسكى فى هذه الرواية : اذا كان الله موجود فانه سيحول دون انتحاره , ولن يستطيع كريلوف ان ينهى وجوده بذاته . ولكن اذا نجح فى قتل نفسه , فانه يستطيع ان يفعل ضد ارادة الله , ويكون هو نفسه اله . ولما لم يكن هناك احد من قبل قد انتحر بهذا الدافع فيكون لكريلوف اذا السبق فى الانتحار , لكى يثبت لنفسه انه لا يعمل وفق الارادة الالهية , وانما يعمل وفق ارادته هو الخاصة .

فى رواية "الاخوة كارامازوف "يقدم دستوفسكى " ميردكوف " كانموذج للشخص الذى يعتقد فى انه لا يوجد شىء بعد الموت . يرى دستوفسكى فى توصيفه لحال بطله هذا ان عدم الاعتقاد بالحياة بعد الموت  من الممكن ان يقود الشخص نحو حالة من اللامبالاة واللامسؤولية , ويفرغ الحياة من محتواها القيمى , ويصير العبث هو المصير المترقب لكل شىء , ما دام كل شىء مصيره الى زوال , يكون الصفر الكبير هو النتيجة النهائية والمؤكدة لكل شىء .

ان الشخص الذى يؤسس موقفه الحياتى على مثل هذه المعتقدات لن يجد امامه سوى الانتحار كمحاولة اخيرة لممارسة حريته , ويتجاوز فيها , وبها حدود العبث الوجودى : اذا كان الله غير موجود فكل شىء مباح , واذا كان كل شىء مباح , فان الانتحار مباح .

من هنا انتهى دستوفسكى الى الاعتقاد بان الايمان بعالم اخر بعد الموت , وان هناك استمرارية وجودية للوجود الانسانى على نحو ما بعد الموت , هو ما يكسب الحياة قيمتها وقيمها , ويجعل لها دلالة ومعنى .

فموقف دستوفسكى هنا هو موقف يكشف عن عقلانية وجودية واضحة , فهو لا يكشف على لسان ابطاله عن عبثية الوجود بقدر ما يكشف عن ضعف يقين المرء فى هذا الوجود , وهو بالتاكيد نمط من الضعف يتوارى خلفه اخفاق المرء فى ادراك الحكمة الدفينة من وراء وجوده , وعدم قدرته استيعاب فكرة ان هناك عالم ما وراء عالمنا الارضى .. وان الحياة هنا ليست هى الخطة النهائية للوجود الانسانى ..  !! 

  

مفهوم الموت عند سقراط

مفهوم الموت عند سقراط

يقوم مفهوم الموت عند سقراط على اعتقاده فى استقلال النفس عن البدن , وان مصيرها مختلف عن مصيره . وهذا الاعتقاد يسير بصوره متوازية مع اعتقاده بتمايز النفس عن البدن :فالنفس هى المبدأ العاقل , والارفع مقاما , والبدن اداتها .

من هنا اعتقد سقراط ان رعاية النفس والاهتمام بها , انما ياتى فى المقام الاعلى عند الانسان كأساس تقوم عليه الحياة الخيرة على الارض . وربما لان النفس لها كل هذه الاهمية , اعتقد سقراط انها لا تزول بعد الموت .

انطلاقا من هذه الاهمية , اعتقد سقراط ان الموت ليس عدما للحياة , بل هو تعديل يطرأ على الحياة . انه استمرار للحياة فى حالة اخرى .

لهذا اعتقد سقراط ان الموت ليس نهاية الحياة , بل هو بالاحرى ابتداءآ لها , ولكن فى مستوى آخر . 

من هنا لا يمثل الموت عند سقراط ماساة حقيقية . او كما يقول الفيلسوف الوجودى كيركجارد :"ان الموت عند سقراط لم يكن امرا مأساويآ فى جوهره , ذلك لان الموت عنده لم يكن شيئآ حقيقيآ ".

ويرتبط اعتقاد سقراط بان الموت ليس نهاية الحياة باعتقاده فى خلود النفس .وهذه نتيجة منطقية ; فما دامت النفس هى اكثر سموا من البدن , وهى وحدها من يملك السمو والتفوق , فمن البديهى ان يعتقد سقراط فى خلودها .

 وقد هدف سقراط من وراء هذه الفكرة الى ابراز التفوق المطلق والمباشر للاخلاق من ناحية , وخفض اهمية صلة القرابة والالتزامات الدنيوية الى حدها الادنى من ناحية اخرى  . 

فعندما تقف النفس - كما يرس سقراط - امام القاضى فانها تقف وحدها مجردة من كل مظاهر العظمة التى كانت تحيط بها إبان حياتها على الارض , ولا يشفع لها حينئذ سوى اخلاقها اثناء حياتها الارضية . لهذا كانت افضل طريقة للحياة عند سقراط " تقوم فى ممارسة العدل والفضيلة .

أصل الموت فى فلسفة القديس أوغسطينوس

أصل الموت فى فلسفة القديس أوغسطينوس

يرى القديس أوغسطينوس ان اصل الموت , وانتقاله الى البشرية انما يرتبط بسقوط الانسان الاول او بالأحرى "سقوط الناس الأولين" , أى أدم وحواء .

يبدأ القديس أوغسطينوس تحليله لأصل الموت بالتأكيد على ان الموت " بالذات , ليس سنة طبيعية , لأن الله لم يخلق أى موت للأنسان إنما عقاب الخطيئة الشرعى , هو الانتقام من الخطئية التى يلاحقها الله ".

فى ضوء ذلك اتجه القديس اوغسطينوس الى تحليل الخطيئة الاولى , وكيف ادت الى سقوط الانسان الاول , ومكابدته الموت .

يرى القديس اوغسطينوس ان الله قد خلق الانسان فى البداية موجودا عاقلا , له ارادة حرة , ويملك القدرة على الاختيار بين الخير والشر . ثم اسكن الله ادم وحواء الفردوس , واوصاهم بأخذ غذائهم من ثمار جميع الاشجار , ما عدا واحدة محرمة عليهم , "لا  لان طبيعتها عاطلة  , بل تمجيدا للخير الصافى من خلال طاعتهم , التى تعتبر الفضيلة الاولى فى نظام الخضوع لله الخالق " .

بيد ان الانسان " لانه مزود بارادة حرة وقادر بالتالى على التمرد والعصيان فانه قد تمرد وعصى " , فأكل من الشجرة التى اوصاه الله بعدم الاقتراب منها :

" آنذاك تغيرت طبيعة أبوينا الأولين وتشوهت فمنعهما العدل الالهى من شجرة الحياة وجعلهما يموتان موتا جسديا نحمله حتما منذ ولادتنا ".

ويرى القديس اوغسطينوس ان خطيئة العصيان تلك ما كان ليقع الانسان فيها " لو لو يبدأ يرتضى ذاته . وفى الواقع , لقد اعطى آذنآ صاغية للكلمة التالية : " سوف تصيران كآلهة " , ذاك ما كانا وصلا اليه لو انهما بقيا متحدين ومطيعين لمبدأهما السامى والحقيقى , بدلا من ان يجعلا نفسيهما , بكبريائهما , مبدأ وجودهما , لان الآلهة المخلوقين ليسوا كذلك بقوتهم الخاصة , بل بصفتهم مشاركين الالهة الحق . من يتوق اليه ان يكون اكثر مما هو له . والانسان الذى يحب ان يكتفى بذاته يفقد حقه من كان يجد فيه ضالته".

وخطأ الانسان هنا لا يكمن فى ارادته شر فى ذاته , بل لانه فى سبيل البحث عن الخير اشاح بوجهه عن الله اعنى عن الافضل , وهو على الرغم من ان الله صنعه فقد فضل نفسه على الله , فجلب بفعلته الموت الى الوجود الانسانى :

" لاننا بحكم .. الخطيئة .. ترانا ضعفاء محكوم علينا بالموت ".

وفى ضوء تحليل القديس اوغسطينوس للخطيئة نستطيع ان نخلص الى النتيجة التالية :

ان الموت لم يدخل الوجود الانسانى بواسطة ارادة الرب , ولكن جوهر مذهب الخطيئة الاولى , هو ان الزوجين الاولين قد عصيا الله بحريتهما , وانهما قد عوقبا بالموت .

الموت اذا كان مصدره قرار حر , وعلى الرغم من ان الرب قد فرضه الا انه جزاء مناسبا تماما للآثم . اما طبيعة هذا الاثم فهى واضحة فى قصة الخطيئة الاولى . فقد كان هذا الاثم هو الرغبة فى" ان يكون شبه الرب " .وهنا ينظر الى الموت على انه ثمرة تجاهل الانسان لحدود وجوده الانسانى كمخلوق يعتمد فى وجوده الاساسى على الله لا على ذاته , فكان الموت , هو العقاب المستحق على محاولة تخطى هذه الحدود , ورفض التبعية لله :

" من اجل ذلك .. دخلت الخطية الى العالم , وبالخطية دخل الموت , وهكذا اجتاز الموت الى جميع الناس .."

Apathy An introduction to the stoic theory of emotions

Apathy

An introduction to the stoic theory of emotions

Apathy is derived from (Greek a, not + patheia, affection, passion, emotion). Apathy is a state of indifference to pleasure or pain in which one gains peace of mind or tranquillity by being emotionally unaffected by the external sensible world. In apathy, the control of emotion by reason is justified on the grounds that emotion is irrational, and it therefore stands in contrast to ordinary indifference or insensitivity. For Stoicism, apathy is the highest virtue, with the Stoic sage characterized as being emotionally detached and acting purely out of reason. 

The Stoics argued that the good for man is not health, wealth or anything that identifies happiness with worldly success. Virtue is beneficial and consists in a wholesome state of mind whereas vice is harmful and involves an unwholesome state of mind. 

Everything that doesn’t involve the pursuit of virtue and the avoidance of vice is indifferent or unnecessary to our happiness. Thus, wealth or health, for example, can be used well or badly. Virtue gives us all that we need for happiness. 

Happiness and unhappiness don’t depend on our genes, upbringing, or other chance occurrences of life. Our reasoning powers give us all we need to live well. Giving way to our emotions is an unhealthy state of mind. 

The virtuous person doesn’t give way to fear, desire, grief, despair or other emotions because they are always in complete possession of their faculties. In being virtuous we are impregnable to the vicissitudes of fortune.

Letter to Menoeceus An introduction to the philosophy of Epicurus

Letter to Menoeceus  An introduction to the philosophy of Epicurus   

I. Introduction 

Let no young man delay the study of philosophy, and let no old man become weary of it; for it is never too early nor too late to care for the well-being of the soul. The man who says that the season for this study has not yet come or is already past is like the man who says it is too early or too late for happiness. Therefore, both the young and the old should study philosophy, the former so that as he grows old he may still retain the happiness of youth in his pleasant memories of the past, the latter so that although he is old he may at the same time be young by virtue of his fearlessness of the future. We must therefore study the means of securing happiness, since if we have it we have everything, but if we lack it we do everything in order to gain it. 

II. Basic Teachings 

A. THE GODS 

The gods exist; but it is impious to accept the common beliefs about them. They have no concern with men 

Practice and study without ceasing that which I was always teaching you, being assured that these are the first principles of the good life. After accepting god as the immortal and blessed being depicted by popular opinion, do not ascribe to him anything in addition that is alien to immortality or foreign to blessedness, but rather believe about him whatever can uphold his blessed immortality. The gods do indeed exist, for our perception of them is clear; but they are not such as the picture of the gods that they first receive. It is not the man who destroys the gods of popular belief who is 

impious, but he who describes the gods in the terms accepted by the many. 

For the opinions of the many about the gods are not perceptions but false suppositions. According to these popular suppositions, the gods send great evils to the wicked, great blessings (to the righteous), for they, being always well disposed to their own virtues, approve those who are like themselves, regarding as foreign all that is different. 

B. DEATH 

Philosophy, showing that death is the end of all consciousness, relieves us of all fear of death A life that is happy is better than one that is merely long. Accustom yourself to the belief that death is of no concern to us, since all good and evil lie in sensation and sensation ends with death. Therefore the true belief that death is nothing to us makes a mortal life happy, not by adding to it an infinite time, but by taking away the desire for immortality. 

For there is no reason why the man who is thoroughly assured that there is nothing to fear in death should find anything to fear in life. So, too, he is foolish who says that he fears death, not because it will be painful when it comes, but because the anticipation of it is painful; for that which is no burden when it is present gives pain to no purpose when it is anticipated. 

Death, the most dreaded of evils, is therefore of no concern to us; for while we exist death is not present, and when death is present we no longer exist. It is therefore nothing either to the living or to the dead since it is not present to the living. And the dead no longer are. 

But men in general sometimes flee death as the greatest of evils, sometimes (long for it) as a relief from (the evils) of life. (The wise man neither renounces life) nor fears its end; for living does not offend him, nor does he suppose that not to live is in any way an evil. As he does not choose the food that is most in quantity but that which is most pleasant, so he does not seek the enjoyment of the longest life but of the happiest. 

He who advises the young man to live well, the old man to die well, is foolish, not only because life is desirable, but also because the art of living well and the art of dying well are one. Yet much worse is he who says that it is well not to have been born, but once born, be swift to pass through Hades' gates. If a man says this and really believes it, why does he not depart from life? 

Certainly the means are at hand for doing so if this really be his firm conviction. If he says it in mockery, he is regarded as a fool among those who do not accept his teaching. 

Remember that the future is neither ours nor wholly not ours, so that we may neither count on it as sure to come nor abandon hope of it as certain not to be. 

III. The Moral Theory 

A. PLEASURE AS THE MOTIVE 

The necessary desires are for health of body and peace of mind; if these are satisfied, that is enough for the happy life. 

You must consider that of the desires some are natural, some are vain, and of those that are natural, some are necessary, others only natural. Of the necessary desires, some are necessary for happiness, some for the ease of the body, some for life itself. The man who has a perfect knowledge of this will know how to make his every choice or rejection tend toward gaining health of body and peace (of mind), since this is the final end of the blessed life. For to gain this end, namely freedom from pain and fear, we do everything. When once this condition is reached, all the storm of the soul is stilled, since the creature need make no move in search of anything that is not lacking, nor seek after anything else to make complete the welfare of the soul and the body. For we only feel the lack of pleasure when from its absence we suffer pain; (but when we do not suffer pain,) we no longer in need of pleasure. For this reason we say that pleasure is the beginning and the end of the blessed life. We recognize pleasure as the first and natural good; starting from pleasure we accept or reject; and we return to this as we judge every good thing, trusting this feeling of pleasure as our guide. 

B. PLEASURES AND PAINS 

Pleasure is the greatest good; but some pleasures bring pain, and in choosing, we must consider this. 

For the very reason that pleasure is the chief and the natural good, we do not choose every pleasure, but there are times when we pass by pleasures if they are outweighed by the hardships that follow; and many pains we think better than pleasures when a greater pleasure will come to us once we have undergone the long-continued pains. Every pleasure is a good since it has a nature akin to ours; nevertheless, not every pleasure is to be chosen. Just so, every pain is an evil, yet not every pain is of a nature to be avoided on all occasions. By measuring and by looking at advantages and disadvantages, it is proper to decide all these things; for under certain circumstances we treat the good as evil, and again, the evil as good. 

C. SELF-SUFFICIENCY 

The truly wise man is the one who can be happy with a little. 

We regard self-sufficiency as a great good, not so that we may enjoy only a few things, but so that, if we do not have many, we may be satisfied with the few, being firmly persuaded that they take the greatest pleasure in luxury who regard it as least needed, and that everything that is natural is easily provided, while vain pleasures are hard to obtain. Indeed, simple sauces bring a pleasure equal to that of lavish banquets if once the pain due to need is removed; and bread and water give the greatest pleasure when one who is in need consumes them. To be accustomed to simple and plain living is conducive to health and makes a man ready for the necessary tasks of life. It also makes us more ready for the enjoyment of luxury if at intervals we chance to meet with it, and it renders us fearless against fortune. 

D. TRUE PLEASURE 

The truest happiness does not come from enjoyment of physical pleasures but from a simple life, free from anxiety, with the normal physical needs satisfied. 

When we say that pleasure is the end, we do not mean the pleasure of the profligate or that which depends on physical enjoyment — as some think who do not understand our teachings, disagree with them, or give them an evil interpretation — but by pleasure we mean the state wherein the body is free from pain and the mind from anxiety. Neither continual drinking and 

dancing, nor sexual love, nor the enjoyment of fish and whatever else the luxurious table offers brings about the pleasant life; rather, it is produced by the reason which is sober, which examines the motive for every choice and rejection, and which drives away all those opinions through which the greatest tumult lays hold of the mind. 

E. PRUDENCE 

Prudence or practical wisdom should be our guide. 

Of all this the beginning and the chief good is prudence. For this reason prudence is more precious than philosophy itself. All the other virtues spring from it. It teaches that it is not possible to live pleasantly without at the same time living prudently, nobly, and justly, (nor to live prudently, nobly, and justly) without living pleasantly; for the virtues have grown up in close union with the pleasant life, and the pleasant life cannot be separated from the virtues.

VIRTUES AND GOOD LIFE: An introduction to the philosophy of Aristotle.

VIRTUES AND GOOD LIFE:  An introduction to the philosophy of Aristotle

Aristotle was born in 384bce in Stagira in northern Greece. His father was a physician for King Philip of Macedonia. Around age seventeen, he went to study at Plato’s Academy in Athens. Aristotle travelled for several years and then for two or three years was the tutor to Alexander, Philip’s young son who later became known as Alexander the Great. In 335bce, Aristotle returned to Athens and organized his own school, called the Lyceum. There he taught and wrote almost until his death thirteen years later, in322bce. 

Aristotle is known not only for his moral theory but also for writings in logic, biology, physics, metaphysics, art, and politics. The basic notions of his moral theory can be found in his Nicomachean Ethics, named for his son Nicomachus. 

Aristotle was one of the earliest writers to ground morality in nature, and specifically in human nature. His theory of ethics and morality also stressed the notion of virtue. For Aristotle, virtue was an excellence of some sort. Our word virtue originally came from the Latin vir and referred to strength or manliness. In Aristotle’s Greek, the term for virtue was a word that can be translated as “excellence.” 

According to Aristotle, there are two basic types of virtue (or excellence): intellectual virtues and moral virtues. Intellectual virtues are excellences of mind, such as the ability to understand and reason and judge well. Moral virtues, on the other hand, dispose us to act well. These virtues are learned by repetition. For instance, by practicing courage or honesty, we become more courageous and honest. 

Just as repetition in playing a musical instrument makes playing easier, so also repeated acts of honesty make it easier to be honest. The person who has the virtue of honesty finds it easier to be honest than the person who does not have the virtue. It has become habitual or second nature to him or her. The same thing applies to the opposite of virtue, namely, vice. The person who lies and lies again finds that lying is easier and telling the truth more difficult. One can have bad moral habits (vices) as well as good ones (virtues). Just like other bad habits, bad moral habits are difficult to change or break. And like other good habits, good moral habits take practice to develop. 

Virtue as a Mean 

Aristotle’s philosophy outlines a variety of particular virtues including courage, temperance, justice, pride, and magnanimity. However, Aristotle also provides a unifying framework for understanding virtue in general, as a mean between extremes. This idea is occasionally known as the Golden Mean. By saying that virtue is a mean, we are using the word with reference to how it is used in mathematics, where the mean is in the middle, as the average. 

To better understand the idea that virtue is a mean, take the following example. The virtue of courage can be understood as a mean or middle between the two extremes of deficiency and excess. Too little courage is cowardice, and too much is foolhardiness. When facing danger or challenges, we should have neither too much fear—which makes us unable to act—nor too little fear—which makes us take reckless or foolish risks. The virtue of courage is having just the right amount of fear, depending on what is appropriate for us as individuals and for the circumstances we face. 

Nature, Human Nature, and the Human Good 

Aristotle was a close observer of nature. In fact, in his writings he mentions some 500 different kinds of animals. He noticed that seeds of the same sort always grew to the same mature form. He opened developing eggs of various species and noticed that these organisms manifested a pattern in their development even before birth. Tadpoles, he might have said, always follow the same path and become frogs, not turtles. So also with other living things. Acorns always become oak trees, not elms. He concluded that there was an order in nature. It was as if natural beings such as plants and animals had a principle of order within them that directed them toward their goal—their mature final form. This view can be called a teleological view, from the Greek word for goal, telos, because of its emphasis on a goal embedded in natural things. It was from this conclusion that Aristotle developed his notion of the good. 

According to Aristotle, “the good is that at which all things aim.” Good things are things that fulfil some purpose or end or goal. Thus, the good of the shipbuilder is to build ships. The good of the lyre player is to play well. The traits that allow for good shipbuilding or lyre-playing will be somewhat different. But good shipbuilders and good lyre players will share certain virtues such as intelligence and creativity. Aristotle asks whether there is anything that is the good of the human being—not as shipbuilder or lyre player, but simply as human. 

To answer this question, we must first think about what it is to be human. According to Aristotle, natural beings come in kinds or species. From their species flow their essential characteristics and certain key tendencies or capacities. A squirrel, for example, is a kind of animal that is, first of all, a living being. It develops from a young to a mature form. It is a mammal and therefore has other characteristics of mammals. It is bushy-tailed, can run along telephone wires, and gathers and stores nuts for its food. From the characteristics that define a squirrel, we also can know what a good squirrel is. A good specimen of a squirrel is one that is effective, successful, and functions well. It follows the pattern of development and growth it has by nature. A good squirrel does, in fact, have a bushy tail and good balance, and knows how to find and store its food. It would be a bad example of a squirrel if it had no balance, couldn’t find its food, or had no fur and was sickly. It would have been better for the squirrel if its inherent natural tendencies to grow and develop and live as a healthy squirrel had been realized. 

Aristotle thought of human beings as natural beings with a specific human nature. Human beings have certain specific characteristics and abilities that we share as humans. Unlike squirrels and acorns, human beings can choose to act in the service of their good or act against it. But just what is their good? 

Aristotle recognized that a good eye is a healthy eye that sees well. A good horse is a well-functioning horse, one that is healthy and able to run and do what horses do. What about human beings? Is there something comparable for the human being as human? Is there some good for humans as humans? Just as we can tell what the good squirrel is from its own characteristics and abilities as a squirrel, the same should be true for the human being. 

For human beings to function well, they should perfect their human capacities. If they do this, they will be functioning well as human beings. They will also be happy, for a being is happy to the extent that it is functioning well. Aristotle believed that the ultimate good of humans is happiness, blessedness, or prosperity. 

The Greek word for this sort of happiness is eudaimonia. Eudaimonia is not to be confused with pleasure. Indeed, the virtues are often at odds with pleasure. A coward who is afraid of danger is reluctant to experience pain. And a courageous person may have to forgo pleasure and submit to pain— including the pain of being killed. Aristotle warned that pleasure can distract us from what is good. Thus, Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia aims at a kind of happiness that is deeper and longer lasting than mere pleasure. The term eudaimonia gives us a clue about this. The eu- prefix means “good”; and daimonia is related to the Greek word for “spirit” or “soul.” Thus, Aristotle’s idea is that virtue produces the happiness of having a good soul or spirit, which fulfils essential human functions or purposes. Aristotle is thus interested in the question of what our human functions or purposes might be. 

Human beings have much in common with lower forms of beings. We are living, for example, just as plants are. Thus, we take in material from outside us for nourishment, and we grow from an immature to a mature form. We have senses of sight and hearing and so forth, as do the higher animals. We are social animals as well, who must live in groups together with other human beings. Since human beings have various functions or purposes, there are various types of virtue. The virtues of social life, for example, help us fulfil our function as social beings. The moral or social virtues would include honesty, loyalty, and generosity. But is there anything unique to humans, an essentially human function or purpose? 

Aristotle believed that it is our “rational element” that is peculiar to us. The good for humans, then, should consist in their functioning in a way consistent with and guided by this rational element. Our rational element has two different functions: one is to know, and the other is to guide choice and action. We must develop our ability to know the world and the truth. 

We must also choose wisely. In doing this, we will be functioning well specifically as humans. Thus, in addition to social or moral virtues, there are also intellectual virtues, which help us fulfil our function as intelligent animals. These virtues, according to Aristotle, include practical knowledge, scientific knowledge, and practical wisdom. It is not surprising that Aristotle—who was a philosopher and a student of Plato—thought that the intellectual virtues were more important than the other virtues, since they help us fulfil our uniquely human capacities.

Philosophy, Violence and War

Philosophy, Violence and War 

Most people assume that there is a right to use violence in self-defense. And many also think that we are permitted (some may say required) to use violence in defense of innocent children. The natural law tradition maintains that individuals have a right to life and liberty—and that violence can be employed to defend life and liberty against those who threaten it, including the life and liberty of defenseless and innocent others. A consequentialist argument could also be used here. More happiness will be produced for more people when such threats are eliminated. For a strict consequentialist, if the goal is to eliminate threats, the means employed are irrelevant. If war or other forms of violence work to produce good outcomes, then these can be used as a tool to defend social welfare. 

Now, we will discuss three alternative approaches to the justification of violence. One maintains that violence is always wrong—this is pacifism. Another approach, often called realism, maintains that there are no moral limits on violence in warfare. In the middle between these two extremes is an idea known as just war theory, which holds that violence can be justified when it is employed in limited and focused ways. 

Central to the discussion of the justification of violence and war is the question of what violence is, and what war is. Violence is generally thought of as the use of physical force to cause injury to another. Physical assaults, shooting, and bombing are examples. War is generally defined as sustained and organized political violence. 

1- REALISM 

Realism is the idea that in the “real world” of social and political life, violence is one tool among others to be employed strategically to get things done. Realists tend to be consequentialists, who are primarily focused on outcomes and results—and who are not as concerned with the morality of the means employed to achieve such results. 

From this perspective, war is understood as an existential struggle for supremacy. Perhaps it is possible to achieve a balance of power between equal powers. But if another power is threatening you, the realist would argue that in a life or death struggle it is necessary to do whatever it takes to defend against the threat of annihilation. 

Realists generally deny that moral ideas can be applied in warfare or that moral concerns should inhibit us from doing what is necessary to achieve victory. If we must bomb civilians or use torture to win a war, then that is what we must do. But realists are not simply bloodthirsty. They might agree that there are good pragmatic reasons to limit the use of violence. Violence can provoke a backlash (as enemies fight harder and unite against a dominant power). For realists, the central question is about what works. If terror bombing works, then it should be used, but if it does not work, then it should be avoided. Realists also have to consider the costs and benefits of warfare. War can be expensive. Realists do not advocate war at any cost. Instead, realists want to be strategic about the use of violence. It is not prudent to get involved in battles that cannot be won or that are so costly that they leave us in a weakened state. For realists, the central conclusion is in war, there is no morality at all. 

2-PACIFISM 

Pacifism lies on the opposite end of the spectrum from realism. While extreme realists argue that there are no moral limits in warfare, extreme pacifists argue that war is always wrong. Pacifism is often grounded in a deontological claim that focuses on the morality of killing. Deontological pacifists will maintain that there is an absolute moral rule against killing. Pacifism is also grounded in a more positive commitment to active nonviolence. Some forms of pacifism extend the idea of nonviolence in a very general way that condemns violence done to sentient beings in general, including nonhuman animals. 

Pacifists generally maintain that nonviolent alternatives to violence are preferable and should be actively pursued in a creative and sustained fashion. Prominent pacifists include Gandhi and Martin Luther King. 

Pacifists believe that nonviolent means work better than violence to produce social goods. Violence does more harm than good, they argue, because violence begets violence. 

Most pacifists argue that killing is wrong. But critics of this view argue that if killing is wrong, there may be times when we need to kill to prevent killing from occurring. Consider, for example, whether it is justifiable to kill those who threaten the innocent. Should an exception to the rule against killing be made to prevent such killing? Would it be acceptable to kill in self-defense? Or in defense of those who are being slaughtered by genocidal or racist governments? Pacifists must address the criticism that it seems inconsistent to hold that life is of the highest value and yet not be willing to use force to defend it. One way they might address this objection is to clarify that pacifism is not passive— pacifists do not advocate doing nothing in response to atrocity. Rather, pacifists can be committed to active, creative, and sustained efforts to help people and defend the innocent, so long as such efforts do not involve killing. Pacifists will also argue that the problem of war is that innocent people are accidentally killed even by the “good guys” and that it is very difficult to focus the destructive power of war in a way that does not harm the innocent. 

3-JUST WAR THEORY 

Intermediate between pacifism and realism is the idea that the use of force, including military force, is justified in limited and specific circumstances. The just war theory attempts to clarify when it is justifiable to resort to the use of lethal force. 

According to Obama, philosophers and theologians developed the just war idea over time as they attempted to find moral language to criticize and limit the destructive power of war. “The concept of a ‘just war’ emerged, suggesting that war is justified only when certain conditions were met: if it is waged as a last resort or in self-defense; if the force used is proportional; and if, whenever possible, civilians are spared from violence. 

As Obama noted, the just war theory is not new. Indeed, the just war theory has a long history. Its origins can be traced to the writings of Augustine, one of the ancient fathers of the Catholic Church. Augustine wanted to reconcile traditional Christian views about the immorality of violence with the necessity of defending the Roman Empire from invading forces. He asked what one should do if one sees an individual attacking an innocent, defenseless victim. His response was that one should intervene and do whatever is necessary (but only so much as was necessary) to protect the victim, even up to the point of killing the aggressor. Further developments of the theory were provided by Thomas Aquinas, who provides a natural law justification of the violence used in self-defense. Medieval codes of chivalry also have something in common with just war ideas. But the theory gets its most systematic exposition in the work of early modern theologians and jurists such as Francisco de Vitoria, Francisco Suarez, and Hugo Grotius. In more recent times, just war ideas have been instituted in international law, which asserts the right of a nation to defend itself against aggression, while also calling for protections for civilians and prisoners of war. These ideas can be found in international conventions, as well as in the Charter of the United Nations and other treaties signed by world powers.

Philosophy and Environment

Philosophy and Environment

Environmental philosophy in its modern form developed in the late 1960s, the product of concerns arising from diverse quarters: naturalists, scientists and other academics, journalists, and politicians. A sense of crisis and doom pervaded the time, reflecting fears about the Cold War and the threat of nuclear annihilation; this malaise helped to spawn the protest music and countercultural protests of the 1960s. In 1962 Rachel Carson published the best-selling book Silent Spring, which documented the accumulation of dangerous pesticides and chemical toxins throughout planetary food webs. In 1968 the journal Science published ―The Tragedy of the Commons by Garrett Hardin, who argued that human self-interest and a growing population would inevitably combine to deplete resources and degrade the environment. In the same year another best-seller, Paul Ehrlich's Population Bomb, anticipated hundreds of millions of deaths in the coming decades because of the failure of food supply to keep pace with an ever-expanding global population. 

Fears about nuclear war, threats of pollution, and emerging awareness of social injustice coalesced first in popular and folk music and then found less poetic expression in academic work. In a seminal essay that appealed to increasingly disenchanted Marxist and left-leaning thinkers, Murray Bookchin remarked that ecology was a critical science with ―explosive implications because ―in the final analysis, it is impossible to achieve a harmonization of man and nature without creating a human community that lives in a lasting balance with its natural environment. When the historian Lynn White Jr. published an essay in 1967 claiming that Judeo-Christian thought was itself a major driver of environmental destruction, the scene was set for full-scale philosophical and ethical soul-searching. Inspired by the work of the American ecologist, forester, and environmentalist Aldo Leopold 

(1887–1948), thinkers in Australia and the United States produced new defenses of the key ideal of his land ethic: that ―land is to be loved and respected is an extension of ethics. 

A key ingredient in Leopold's land ethic was the notion that the community of life itself matters, not just its individual members; he wrote that ―a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise. 

In 1973, Arne Naess coined the term “deep ecology,” intending to highlight the importance of norms and social change in environmental decision-making. 

The development of Deep Ecology by the Norwegian Arne Naess followed a rather different route. During a climbing expedition to Nepal, Naess found that Sherpa people would not venture onto sacred mountains. In the wake of this discovery, Naess and two of his Norwegian friends discussed formulating a new philosophy that would extend such reverence for mountains to all of nature, emphasizing the interconnectedness of each thing in larger webs of value. In place of the isolated or atomic individual, Naess postulates people and other things as constituted by their relationships with others—as knots in a larger web of life. While such a relational conception of the self might be thought to resonate with animist, Confucian, or Buddhist traditions (Naess had no problem with such conflations), Naess himself claimed to draw his philosophical inspiration largely from the seventeenth-century Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677).Taking relationships seriously, Naess argues, means that humans should care for the extended, or ecological, self because each person is more than just his or her body. Extended self-concern obliges humans not only to connect with and care about the other people who have made them what they are but also to care for the multifarious systems and beings on which continued human existence depends. 

In his early work Naess seemed to regard all living things as having equal value, at least in principle, but by the 1980s he was prepared to support only the weaker claim that the flourishing of all life, both human nonhuman, has value in its own right. 

Through the 1970s and 1980s these themes of atomism, human-centeredness, and the scope of what is intrinsically valuable set much of the agenda for further theorizing. With the introduction of the idea of ―'animal liberation in 1973 (Singer 2003), there was a swell of support for the idea that the capacity to feel pleasures or pains might be a significant criterion of moral value, or at least of moral considerability. On this view, although things that are morally valuable ought to be protected, things that are ―morally considerable‖ ought to figure directly in human thinking and planning but need not necessarily be protected. In the North American and European ethical tradition, moral considerability has been connected with notions of rationality, self-awareness, consciousness, and other typically human features. Environmental philosophy has explored new criteria of such considerability, including being alive, being a community or a holistic entity of a certain kind, being an entity or organism that has an end in itself, being a subject of a life lacking intrinsic function, being a product of natural processes or being naturally autonomous. While no agreement on such a criterion emerged, it was clear that the notions of respect for nature, nature's value, nature's intrinsic worth, and the moral considerability of natural things were not only intelligible but also capable of being hotly debated in considerable depth.